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ABSTRACT
Covert channels enable information leakage across security bound-
aries of the operating system. Microarchitectural covert channels
exploit changes in execution timing resulting from competing ac-
cess to limited hardware resources. We use the recent experimental
support for time protection, aimed at preventing covert channels,
in the seL4 microkernel and evaluate the efficacy of the mecha-
nisms against five known channels on Ariane, an open-source 64-bit
application-class RISC-V core. We confirm that without hardware
support, these defences are expensive and incomplete. We show
that the addition of a single-instruction extension to the RISC-V
ISA, that flushes microarchitectural state, can enable the OS to
close all five evaluated covert channels with low increase in context
switch costs and negligible hardware overhead. We conclude that
such a mechanism is essential for security.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Hardware security implementa-
tion; Operating systems security; • Computer systems orga-
nization→ Reduced instruction set computing.
KEYWORDS
covert channels, timing channels, computer architecture, microar-
chitecture, operating systems, system security, time protection
1 INTRODUCTION
A covert channel is an information flow that uses a mechanism
not intended for information transfer [20], and thereby violates
a system’s security policy that the OS is meant to enforce. For
example, some untrusted code, such as a mail client, may be given
access to secrets but should be confined to only communicate with
the outside world via an encrypted channel. A covert channel can
enable the mailer to leak the raw secrets, bypassing encryption.
Covert channels that utilise OS-managed spatial resources (stor-
age channels) can be eliminated completely, as was proved for the
seL4 microkernel [23]. Harder to control are channels that target
physical quantities not directly managed by the OS, such as proces-
sor temperature [22] or power draw [17]. Particularly dangerous are
timing channels, which exploit information encoded in the timing
of events, as they can be exploited remotely.
Of particular importance are microarchitectural timing channels;
these exploit competition for limited hardware resources that are
hidden by the instruction set architecture (ISA) [10]. For example,
the Spectre attack [19] uses speculation to construct a Trojan from
“gadgets” in innocent code, with the Trojan leaking arbitrary infor-
mation through a microarchitectural timing channel. Exploitable
resources are those holding state that depends on execution history,
which includes caches, TLBs, branch predictors, and prefetchers.
Time protection, a set of OS mechanisms complementing the es-
tablished memory protection, aims to prevent timing channels [9].
However, its proponents also demonstrated that on contempo-
rary hardware full time protection is unachievable, as some ex-
ploitable microarchitectural states cannot be reset by software.
They consequently argue that the hardware-software contract must
be amended to provide the OS with the mechanisms for resetting
exploitable microarchitectural state [11].
In this work, we investigate such mechanisms by implementing
them in Ariane, an open-source, application-class, in-order, RISC-V
RV64 core. We evaluate their efficacy on five known microarchitec-
tural channels, and the overheads imposed by their use. Specifically,
we make the following contributions:
(1) We measure the capacites of five established microarchitec-
tural covert channels on the unmodified Ariane core, and
confirm that they are comparable to those found in high-
performance Intel and Arm processors.
(2) We confirm previous observations on Intel and Arm cores
that software-only approaches are expensive and ineffective.
(3) We demonstrate the importance of resetting all microar-
chitectural state by showing that after resetting first-order
state (valid bits), secondary state (e.g. state bits in the cache
replacement policies) can still be exploited.
(4) We propose a new RISC-V fence instruction, whose argu-
ment lets the OS control which state is flushed, and demon-
strate that it completely eliminates the studied channels.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Threat Model
We examine covert-channel leakage under a confinement sce-
nario [20]: An untrusted program possesses a secret, and the OS
encapsulates the program’s execution in a security domain that only
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Figure 1: A cache before and after the Trojan encodes the
secret s.
allows communication across defined channels to trusted compo-
nents (e.g., an encryption service). The untrusted program contains
a Trojan that is actively trying to leak the secret via a covert channel.
A second, unconfined, and also untrusted security domain contains
a spy which is trying to read the secret leaked by the Trojan.
Intentional leakage by a Trojan represents the worst case leakage;
if we can prevent it, we also preclude any other leakage through
the same channel. In particular, this rules out side channels, where
instead of a Trojan, the leakage originates from an unwitting victim.
We assume that the Trojan and spy time-share a core, meaning
cross-core leakage is out of scope. We only consider microarchitec-
tural timing channels. Covert channels that abuse other character-
istics, such as power draw, are out of scope.
2.2 Exploitable Microarchitectural State
Exploits of data and instruction caches have been known for
decades [14]. The cache lines used by the Trojan create a foot-
print that can be sensed by the spy: It observes the latencies of its
own memory accesses, which are high where a cache line has been
replaced by the Trojan (see Section 2.3 for details). TLBs are caches
for translation data and can be similarly exploited [15].
The branch predictor also contains caches that can be ex-
ploited [1]: the branch target buffer (BTB), which caches the des-
tination addresses of indirect jumps, and the branch history table
(BHT), which predicts whether conditional branches are taken.
Instruction and data prefetchers contain state machines which
accumulate history and can be exploited [9]. However, simple pro-
cessors such as our Ariane core do not feature prefetching; we
therefore do not investigate this channel.
2.3 Exploiting Covert Channels
Techniques for exploiting covert channels are well established;
for our scenario of intentional leakage, the prime-and-probe (P&P)
attack [25] is simple and effective.
In a P&P attack, the spy first forces the exploited hardware re-
source into a known state (prime). For the D-cache this means
traversing a large buffer (in cache-line-sized strides for efficiency),
for the I-cache by executing a series of linked jumps. The TLBs are
similarly primed by accessing or jumping with page-size strides.
(This is a somewhat simplified description – in general it is nec-
essary to randomise the access order to prevent interference from
prefetching, but that is not an issue on our processor.) With a
correctly-sized priming buffer, this leaves the hardware resource in
a state where further accesses by the spy within the same address
range are fast, as illustrated on the left of Figure 1.
At the end of its time slice, the OS preempts the spy and switches
to the Trojan, which accesses a subset of the hardware resource
to encode the secret. Given a D-cache of n lines, the Trojan can
transmit a secret s ≤ n, the input signal, by touching s cache lines,
thereby replacing the spy’s content. The resulting state is illustrated
on the right of Figure 1. Obviously, more complex encodings are
possible to increase the amount of data transferred in a time slice
(the channel capacity), but for our purposes, the simple encoding is
sufficient, as we want to prevent any leakage.
When execution switches back to the spy, it again traverses
(probes) the whole buffer, observing its execution time. Each entry
replaced by the Trojan’s execution leads to a cache miss, and results
in an increase in probe time. If the latency of a hit is thit and that of a
miss is tmiss > thit, the total latency increase is s ·(tmiss−thit). For our
simple encoding scheme, the output signal is the total probe time,
which is linearly correlated to the input signal. Amore sophisticated
encoding schemewould have to measure the time of each individual
access and perform a more complex analysis.
2.4 Time Protection
Time protection is a recently proposed, principled approach to
eliminating timing channels [9]. While the established notion of
memory protection prevents interference between security domains
through unauthorised memory accesses, time protection aims to
prevent interference that affects observable timing behaviour.
Time protection requires that all shared hardware resources,
including non-architected ones, must be partitioned between se-
curity domains, either temporally (secure time multiplexing) or
spatially. Ge et al. show that (physically-addressed) off-core caches
can be effectively partitioned through cache colouring [16], which
leverages the associative cache lookup to force different partitions
into disjoint subsets of the cache. They demonstrate that colouring
is effective in preventing cache channels in both intra-core and
cross-core attacks and comes with low overhead.
Spatial partitioning is generally impossible for on-core resources
for lack of hardware support. These are usually also fairly small and
highly utilised by a single program, so partitioning would result
in unacceptable performance degradation. Furthermore, on-core
resources are accessed by virtual address, which is not under OS
control, making approaches such as colouring infeasible.
This leaves temporal partitioning for on-core resources. In order
to prevent any interference between security domains, each such
resource must be reset to a state that is independent of execution
history before handing it to a different domain. This means that
the OS must be provided with the means to perform such a reset of
all microarchitectural state, creating the requirement of extending
the hardware-software contract to refer (in a highly abstract way)
to such non-architected state [11]. The authors specifically show
that contemporary Intel and Arm processors lack the mechanisms
required for implementing time protection.
2.5 Proposed Temporal Fence
We introduce such a mechanism in the form of a temporal fence in-
struction, fence.t, which isolates the timing of any subsequent ex-
ecution from what happened before.1 Our fence instruction specifi-
cally applies to on-core state only, as off-core state can be spatially
partitioned. We realise that this definition is less abstract than one
1Krste Asanović introduced the notion of a temporal fence on the RISC-V mailing list.
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Figure 2: Encoding of the fence.t instruction.
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Figure 3: Relationship of the measured parameters.
might wish, and is therefore unlikely to be the last word on the
topic. However, it suits our present purpose of evaluating the de-
sired functionality.
We parameterise the fence.t instruction by the microarchitec-
tural state targeted, as suggested by Ge et al.. This helps the OS to
minimise flushing according to its security requirements. For this
study, it has the additional benefit that we can target individual
channels for a fine-grained examination of efficacy.
We encode the fence.t instruction as a custom U-type instruc-
tion with the RISC-V opcode custom-0 (Figure 2). A bitmap passed
as the 20-bit immediate value selects the components to be flushed.
3 METHODOLOGY
We adopt the approach of Ge et al. [11] for quantifying and evalua-
tion leakage and prevention strategies.
3.1 Measuring Leakage
We run each attack for a number of iterations, the sample size, usu-
ally 1 million. In each iteration, i , the Trojan encodes as input value
a randomly chosen secret, si , and the spy subsequently measures
as the output value its probe latency, ti . s and t can be regarded
as samples of the random variables S and T , see Figure 3. A covert
channel exploits the correlation of the two random variables: If the
output t is correlated with the input s , there is a covert channel
that transfers information from the Trojan to the spy.
We use a combination of two indicators: The channel matrix as a
visual representation of leakage, and the discrete mutual information
M as a quantitative metric.
3.1.1 Channel Matrix. The channel matrix represents the con-
ditional probability of observing a particular output value, t ,
given input value s . The conditional probability distribution
p(t | s) can be computed directly from the measured sample pairs
{(s1, t1), . . . , (sN , tN )}.
We represent the channel matrix as a heat map: Inputs vary
horizontally and outputs vertically, and bright colours indicate high,
dark colours low probability (see Figure 6 for examples). A variation
of colour along any horizontal line through the graph indicates a
dependence of the output on the input, and thus a channel.
3.1.2 Mutual Information. For quantifying channel capacity we
usemutual informationM, the amount of information gained about
a random variable by observing another, possibly correlated random
variable [27]. It can be expressed as the difference between the
marginal entropy H(T ) and the conditional entropy H(T | S):
M = I(S ;T ) = H(T ) − H(T | S)
Channel bench
Trojan Spy
seL4 microkernel
Ariane RISC-V core
Application
Supervisor
Hardware platform
Figure 4: Evaluation platform.
M is measured in bits; as most of our channel capacities are
small, we use millibits (1mb = 10−3 b). Intuitively, mutual informa-
tion is the difference of the information gained by observing the
random variable T without and with knowledge of the second ran-
dom variable S . If both random variables are highly correlated (i.e.,
there exists a covert channel), the information gained by observing
S is low and the mutual information becomes high. Conversely, if
both random variables are uncorrelated, we have H(T ) = H(T | S)
and thereforeM = 0.
Zero Leakage Upper BoundM0. Since all measurements are af-
fected by noise,M will never be zero, even if there is no channel.We
use a Monte Carlo simulation for estimating the apparent channel
produced by this noise. Specifically, we rearrange the input/output
pairs into uniformly random pairs and thus remove any correla-
tion between them, while retaining their original value ranges and
spreads. Any mutual information that is measured from this data
can only be due to noise. We repeat this process 1000 times and
then compute the 95%-confidence intervalM0 for an experiment
without a channel. We conclude that a channel is definitely present
ifM > M0, else that the result is consistent with no channel.
We use the leakiEst tool [3] to compute mutual informationM
and zero leakage upper boundsM0.
3.2 Evaluation Platform
3.2.1 Ariane. The hardware platform for evaluating channels and
defences is based on Ariane, an open-source, RV64GC, 6-stage RISC-
V core developed at ETH Zurich [33]. It is implemented in Sys-
temVerilog and publicly available on GitHub [32]. It features three
privilege levels and virtual memory (SV39) from the privileged
ISA specification [30], and thus supports full-fledged operating sys-
tems. Its configurability, simplicity, and openness make it a good
candidate for architectural exploration.
Setup. We instantiate the Ariane core on an FPGA (Digilent
Genesys II), running at 50 MHz, using the standard configuration
with an 8-way, 32 KiB write-through L1-D and a 4-way, 16 KiB L1-I
cache. Both use 16-byte lines and a pseudo-random replacement
strategy driven by an 8-bit linear-feedback shift register (LFSR).
The L1-D is accessed by the load-, store-, and memory-management
units, with concurrent accesses arbitrated round-robin. The branch
predictor has a 64-entry BHT and a 16-entry BTB. There is a single-
level, unified, fully associative, 16-entry TLB using a pseudo-LRU
replacement policy. For reducing write-stalls we increase the write
buffer to 40 entries. We add some off-core components, including a
timer and a 512KiB write-back L2 cache [26] that is connected to
DRAM. Figure 5 shows the memory architecture.
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Figure 5: Memory system of the Ariane SoC.
We partition the L2 cache by colouring [16], which precludes
channels in the memory backend and allows us to focus on channels
resulting from on-core state.
3.2.2 OS. Ge’s channel bench [7, 8] provides a minimal OS and
data collection infrastructure; we port it to RISC-V and adapt to
Ariane. Channel bench uses attack implementations from theMastik
toolkit [31], running on an experimental version of seL4 [18] that
supports time protection. seL4 is an open-source, high-performance
OS microkernel with formal proofs of implementation correctness
and security enforcement, making it highly suitable for security
evaluations, although our experimental version is not verified.
4 COVERT-CHANNEL CAPACITIES
4.1 Baseline: No Time Protection
To establish a baseline and compare to other architectures, we apply
the P&P attacks to our Ariane RV64GC core, with time protection
disabled in seL4. We observe strong channels through each of the
five microarchitectural resources targeted. As shown in the Unmiti-
gated column of Table 1, capacities range from 0.4 to 4 bits. TheM0
are all well below 1mb, indicating that the channels are real. To put
those numbers into context: Assuming the OS uses a 1ms time slice,
Trojan and spy will each execute 500 times per second. The 1.6 b
capacity of the D-cache thus means the channel has a bandwidth
of 833 b/s, able to leak a 1024-bit RSA key in just over a second.
Also, these channels use a rather primitive encoding scheme; more
sophistication could increase the bandwidth significantly.
The channel capacities we observe agree nicely with the prior
work, which showed unmitigated capacities of 0.3–4 b on Intel and
7.5mb to 2.5 b on Arm processors [9].
Figure 6a and Figure 7a show the unmitigated channel matrices
for the L1-D cache and the BHT, respectively; N is the number of
iterations. The clear diagonal pattern indicates a strong correlation
of output with input signals, establishing efficient channels. For
example, Figure 7a shows that if the spy observes a probe time of
380 cycles, it can infer with a high confidence that the Trojan has
encoded the value 48.
4.2 Using Existing Instructions Only
Ge et al. report that neither the x86 nor the Arm architectures pro-
vide sufficient mechanisms for implementing time protection, with
Arm coming closer in at least providing targeted L1 cache flushes.
The Intel architecture does not have those, and the authors imple-
mented software flushing by touching all cache lines, similar to the
prime phase of the P&P attack. Such an approach is expensive and
Table 1: Mutual information and corresponding zero leak-
age upper bound in millibits.
Unmitigated First fence.t Final fence.t
M M0 M M0 M M0
L1 D$ 1667.3 0.5 10.4 6.0 33.3 39.1
L1 I$ 1905.0 0.5 8.3 4.9 37.9 39.4
TLB 408.7 0.1 5.0 5.9 3.1 7.7
BTB 3211.4 0.1 35.7 59.3 28.2 60.3
BHT 3770.6 0.2 45.2 58.8 44.1 60.8
obviously brittle, as it must make assumptions on the replacement
policy which may not hold in reality. Unsurprisingly, they find that
this defence is incomplete, leaving residual channels that the OS is
unable to close.
With RISC-V, the situation is presently worse, as specification of
cache management is still under discussion. While implementations
generally support some cache management, this is consequently
not standardised. To explore this aspect, we implement a “software
only” defence, where the OS uses only mechanisms defined in the
ISA as presently specified. This basically forces the OS to resort to
the priming approach in an attempt to erase any microarchitectural
state left by the Trojan’s execution.
Figure 6b shows the result for the L1-D cache channel, where the
OS performs two priming runs per context switch. While fuzzier
than in the unmitigated case, a clear diagonal pattern persists, and
the measured capacity is only reduced by 70%, making this defence
highly ineffective, a result that is muchworse thanGe et al. observed
for Intel. The reasons are for one the Ariane’s replacement policy,
which uses a pseudo-random sequence with a period of 256. This
makes it practically impossible to flush the cache reliably through
priming. Furthermore, there is secondary state that is even harder
to reset, as we will find in Section 4.3.2.
4.3 Using a Temporal Fence
As discussed in Section 2.5 we add a new fence.t instruction to
the Ariane. When fence.t is committed, Ariane’s controller sends
a flush signal to all stateful microarchitectural components. To give
the operating system maximum control, an immediate value selects
the components to be flushed.
4.3.1 First Attempt. As we want to minimise the cost of the fence,
we only flush state that seems to be relevant for the P&P attacks.
In particular, we reset the L1 cache and TLB state by clearing the
valid bits (remember, our Ariane’s L1-D is a write-through cache
so there is no dirty state to write back). Similarly, we reset the
saturation counter of the BHT. To avoid interfering with in-flight
computations, we also flush the pipeline.
We find that this is insufficient, as shown in Figure 6c. While
the channel pattern is gone, the channel is not quite closed: The
channel matrix shows slight patters along horizontal lines. The
mutual information, shown in Table 1 as “First fence.t”, is almost
twice the zero-leakage bound, confirming the channel.
4.3.2 Improved Fence. Investigating the source, we identify further
state that indirectly affects timing. Most prominently,
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Figure 6: L1 data cache channel matrices.
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Figure 7: BHT channel matrices.
• the LFSR used for victim selection in L1 cache replacement
• the round robin arbiter of the L1 data cache
• the pseudo-LRU tree for the TLB replacement strategy.
We include these components in the flush and re-run the ex-
periments, the results are shown as “Final fence.t” in Table 1.
All measured channel capacities are now clearly below the zero-
capacity threshold, meaning that there is no evidence of a residual
channel. The channel matrices confirm this: Figure 6d and Figure 7b
only show patterns that appear to be random noise (confirmed by
visual comparison between multiple runs).
5 COST
5.1 Context-Switch Latency
Time protection resets hardware state on a switch of security parti-
tion, which implies a full context switch. seL4’s IPC is essentially a
user-triggered context switch [12] with roughly the same cost as a
time-slice preemption, and the seL4 benchmark suite [21] provides
a convenient rig for measuring its latency. We use inter-address-
space IPC for evaluating flush cost. Table 2 compares the latencies
of various configurations. Here “hot” measures the best-case of
switching for and back in a tight loop, where the whole working
set fits into the L1 caches. The cold-cache scenario is the realistic
baseline for our purposes, as a security-domain switch is normally
triggered by time-slice preemption; as time slices are 1ms or longer,
the newly executing domain is unlikely to have any hot data left in
the small L1 caches. We achieve the cold state by executing fence.t
from user mode (before the timed context-switch).
The third column shows the latency with the OS trying to reset
state by double priming as discussed in Section 4.2, note that this
only attempts to mitigate the D-cache channel. Finally, “fence.t”
uses the full flush provided by the temporal fence.
We already found in Section 4.2 that the software priming is
highly ineffective, the results here show that it is also very expen-
sive, increasing context-switch latency by a factor of 50 over the
cold-cache case (while not even attempting to mitigate channels
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Table 2: seL4 IPC latencies and standard deviations in cycles.
Unmitigated Mitigated
Hot Cold D-cache prime fence.t
430 (±7.0) 1,180 (±1.0) 51,877 (±256) 1,502 (±0.9)
other than the L1-D). In contrast, the temporal fence, which we
have found to be highly effective against all channels, only adds
320 cycles (less than 30%) to the cold-cache latency. With a switch
rate of no more than 1 kHz, this adds negligible cost.
The dominating contribution to the direct latency of the fence.t
instruction is the cache flush. A write-through cache is flushed by
clearing all valid bits. This is a constant-time operation, which could
in theory be performed in a single cycle. However, in Ariane’s write-
through cache, the valid bits are stored together with the tags in
sequentially accessible SRAM, allowing for an invalidation of only
one set per cycle, and thus resulting in a latency of 256 cycles. All
other state can be reset in a single cycle.
A write-back L1-D cache would be more expensive to flush, as
each dirty line must we written back to the L2. Since the L2 of our
platform can process up to 8 B per cycle, the theoretical latency
for a write-back variant varies between 0 cycles (clean cache) and
4,096 cycles (all lines dirty). In such a case of a variable latency, the
OS must pad to the worst-case latency, to prevent the flush latency
becoming a covert channel [11].
5.2 Hardware Overhead
To estimate the hardware costs incurred by the fence.t instruction,
we examine the resource utilization of our FPGA. The number of
deployed LUTs remains within 1% of the original size. Hence, the
mechanism should not cause a notable increase in chip area or
power draw of the design.
6 RELATEDWORK
Past work has approached the hardware mitigation of microarchi-
tectural covert channels from different angles. Page [24] propose
static partitioning of the L1 cache while Wang and Lee [28] propose
locking cache lines. While spatial partitioning can certainly prevent
attacks, in the case of the L1, the reduction of available cache space
would have a major impact on application performance. Wang and
Lee [29] instead aim to defeat attacks by dynamically remapping
cache lines.
A hardware feature that aims to detect an ongoing cache-based
covert channel attack is proposed by Chen and Venkataramani [2].
Fang et al. present a method to scramble information transmitted
over such a channel by leveraging cache prefetchers [5, 6]. This is
not applicable to Ariane, which lacks prefetching.
Fadiheh et al. [4] suggest a formal method for detecting vulnera-
ble microarchitectural components within the HW design. While
such an approach could prove crucial for the systematic uncov-
ering of microarchitectural covert channels, the question of their
mitigation remains open.
Our work extends that of Ge et al., who propose time protection
and the need for flushing all microarchitectural on-core state on a
partition switch, and demonstrate the need for hardware support [8,
9, 11], which is what our temporal fence provides.
7 CONCLUSION
On a simple in-order application-class RISC-V processor we evalu-
ate microarchitectural covert timing channels, previously demon-
strated on x86 and Arm processors, and find that they exist with
similar capacities on the RISC-V core. We confirm the finding of Ge
et al. [10] that existing architected mechanisms are insufficient for
preventing those channels. Answering their request for improved
hardware support that will enable a principled prevention of such
channels, we propose a temporal fence instruction, fence.t.
An implementation of fence.t on our RISC-V core shows that
the naive approach of just clearing all valid bits on cache lines
is insufficient. Instead we find that secondary state, in our case
the state machine controlling cache-line replacement, can also be
exploited as a covert channel, and must be reset as well. We then
demonstrate that a complete state flush is successful in eliminating
all channels to well below measurement accuracy. We also find
that while the (largely ineffective) attempts to close channels with
existing instructions are extremely costly, the overhead of fence.t
is very low, about 320 cycles on our core, which is insignificant at
typical partition-switch rates of 1 kHz or lower. We similarly find
that the area and power overheads of fence.t are insignificant.
Our findings show that the mechanisms requested by OS re-
searchers for principled timing-channel prevention are feasible and
low cost, and there seems to be no good reason not to include them
into the architecture. This confirms that security should be seen as
a hardware-software codesign problem, where OS researchers and
architects must collaborate closely.
We hope our findings will support current work that aims at
provably eliminating microarchitectural timing channels [13].
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A CHANNEL MATRICES
0 64 128 192 256
80,000
85,000
Secret
Ti
m
e
(c
yc
le
s)
0
10−2
10−1
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
(a) Unmitigated. N = 106, M = 1667.3mb, M0 = 0.5mb.
0 64 128 192 256
91,000
91,500
92,000
92,500
Secret
Ti
m
e
(c
yc
le
s)
0
10−2
10−1
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
(b) Attempted reset by priming once. N = 106, M = 1471.5mb,
M0 = 0.5mb.
0 64 128 192 256
92,000
92,500
93,000
Secret
Ti
m
e
(c
yc
le
s)
0
10−2
10−1
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
(c) Attempted reset by priming twice. N = 106, M = 515.7mb,
M0 = 1.1mb.
0 64 128 192 256
92,520
92,540
92,560
92,580
Secret
Ti
m
e
(c
yc
le
s)
0
10−3
10−2
10−1
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
(d) Original fence clearing first-order state.N = 106,M = 10.4mb,
M0 = 6.0mb.
0 64 128 192 256
92,540
92,560
92,580
92,600
Secret
Ti
m
e
(c
yc
le
s)
0
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
(e) Improved fence (1). N = 106, M = 33.3mb, M0 = 39.1mb.
0 64 128 192 256
92,520
92,540
92,560
92,580
Secret
Ti
m
e
(c
yc
le
s)
0
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
(f) Improved fence (2). N = 106, M = 31.1mb, M0 = 38.6mb.
Figure 8: L1 data cache channel matrices.
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Figure 9: L1 instruction cache channel matrices.
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Figure 10: TLB channel matrices.
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Figure 11: BTB channel matrices.
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Figure 12: BHT channel matrices.
